In this context, it is important to ensure that the licence does not contain severe competition restrictions set out in the TTBE. The existence of such restrictions is extremely difficult to justify under Article 101, paragraph 3, and should nullify the entire licence and expose the parties to the risk of fines and actions for damages from third parties. The specific restrictions of an IPR licence between competitors under the TTBE are as follows: this guide provides an overview of the areas covered by the guidelines and horizontal cooperation in the licensing of intellectual property rights between competitors (which enjoys a separate category exemption with accompanying guidelines). It begins with an overview of the main legal aspects of assessing agreements between competitors before examining the following types of cooperation between competitors: some vertical agreements are likely to contain restrictions that do not conform to Article 101 of the TFUE. These are agreements that contain provisions: the Commission generally refers to these agreements as `marketing agreements`. This applies to the joint sale, where the parties agree on all commercial aspects related to the sale of the product, including the price. However, it also includes more limited forms of cooperation, such as distribution agreements. B (for example. B, a party appoints its competitor for the distribution of its products in a given territory), after-sales service, advertising or logistics. In addition, vertical agreements appear to be more effective in commercial activity.

The most common vertical restrictions are: Article 101, paragraph 1, of the TFUE prohibits agreements between companies with the purpose or effect of restricting, preventing or distorting competition within the EU and affecting trade between EU Member States. This prohibition is relevant to all agreements between two or more companies, whether they are competitors. The SBE exempts all common production and specialization agreements (including ancillary ip and related purchase and delivery obligations, and associated joint distribution): whether a vertical agreement effectively limits competition and whether, in this case, the benefits outweigh the anti-competitive effects, often depends on the structure of the market. The Commission recognises that joint procurement agreements can often promote competition by allowing smaller competitors to achieve purchasing savings similar to those of large competitors, which can lead to increased competition, for example in the form of lower prices and/or quality products or services. Finally, it should be noted that the Office of Fair Trading (predecessor of the British Competition and Market Authority) adopted a more favourable approach to joint purchasing in April 2010 in its succinct opinion on a joint purchase agreement between Palmer and Harvey McLane and Makro Self-Service Wholesalers (predecessor of the UK Competition and Market Supervisory Authority). In particular, it interpreted that, while the distinction between “purpose” and “effective” offences is somewhat blurred, “Offences of purpose” are in principle the result of conduct that is inherently (or manifestly) anti-competitive and is therefore at the “more serious” end of the scale – “serious” in terms of the likelihood of causing harm and/or the absence of overt or credible characteristics of pro-competitive withdrawals. Contracting parties may include restrictions or contractual obligations in vertical agreements to protect an investment or simply to ensure day-to-day activity (for example. B, sales, supply or purchase agreements). There is no category exemption from general application to standardization agreements, although standards-setting activities in certain sectors, such as insurance. B, have been automatically exempted in the past under sector category exemptions.